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Abstract
The current study empirically investigates and shows that on average, the possible
implementation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would
generally help in the fight against global warming. In particular, the study finds that a
one percent increase in the bilateral trade between the U.S. and the typical EU member
would reduce annual per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs in the typical TTIP member
by about 2.7 and 2.4 percent, respectively. However, results also show that TTIP may
increase annual per capita emissions of GHGs in the U.S. by about 2.5 percent per year.
These results stand because the factor endowment hypothesis (FEH) and the pollution
haven hypothesis based on population density variations (PHH2) appear to dominate
the pollution haven hypothesis based on national income differences (PHH1).
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1 Introduction
The possible creation of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and EU (so far the biggest
common free trade area in the world), the so-called Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), has generated a lot of debate on both sides of the Atlantic. During their
ongoing negotiations, both the U.S. and EU have been evaluating the pros and cons that
such an agreement would have on both regions.1 These pros and cons concern not only the
economic and political implications but also the environmental impact of the agreement.2
This paper attempts to shed some light on the latter by considering the TTIP impact on
its members’ pollution emissions of CO2 and GHGs, the two most important air pollutants
associated with global warming.
There is a burgeoning literature on the effects of trade liberalization on the environ-
ment. Following this literature, one would expect, at least in theory, a GDP increase on
both sides of the Atlantic as a result of TTIP. Assuming that everything else remains con-
stant, a boost in production would then raise pollution levels in all TTIP members. This
phenomenon is known as the scale effect. However, opposite to the scale effect, the tech-
nique effect suggests that the implementation of TTIP could simultaneously be beneficial to
the environment. The later effect works through the upgrades in the production method-
ology, through the adoption of environmentally friendly technologies, and through the
increased public awareness towards the consumption of pollution-intensive goods. In ad-
dition, the TTIP implementation may produce a composition effect. This effect refers to
the changes in pollution levels due to the changes in the relative share of different goods
1TTIP has also been known as the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA)
2According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, “TTIP is an is an ambitious, compre-
hensive, and high-standard trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the United States
and the European Union. T-TIP will help unlock opportunity for American families, workers, businesses,
farmers and ranchers through increased access to European markets for Made-in-America goods and ser-
vices. This will help to promote U.S. international competitiveness, jobs and growth”. According to the
European Commission, TTIP could be responsible for creating millions of jobs in both sides of Atlantic
and promote growth by boosting the U.S. and EU economies by 90 and 120 billions of Euro respectively.
TTIP is still under negotiations (there have been so far, 14th rounds of negotiations between a high offi-
cial of the U.S. and EU) despite the efforts of President Obama to reach an agreement before the end of
his second term in the White House. In various reports published by the respective officials in the U.S.
(available online at https://ustr.gov/ttip) and EU (available online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ttip/), there is a chapter entitled “Raw Materials and Energy” that discusses the environmental is-
sues and goals associated with the implementation of TTIP. In particular, according to Article 9 of this
chapter entitled “Cooperation on Energy and Raw Materials”, they claim that TTIP “would promote re-
search, development, and innovation in the areas of energy efficiency, sustainable renewable energy, and
raw materials”, or it would “promote internationally high standard of safety and environmental protection
for offshore oil, gas, and mining operations, by increasing transparency, sharing information, including on
industry safety and environmental performance”. For more details see the technical report available online
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154837.pdf.
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in the aggregate national production. According to the composition effect, the adoption
of TTIP may denigrate (improve) the environment if the production of capital-intensive
(labor-intensive) goods increases due to the higher accumulation of physical capital.3
On the other hand, the TTIP implementation could increase pollution in the low-income
and/or sparsely populated countries due to the existence of lax environmental regula-
tions in these countries, following a typical Heckscher-Ohlin framework. These economic
phenomena stem from trade liberalization and fall under the pollution haven hypothesis.
Trade liberalization may also create a factor endowment hypothesis (henceforth, FEH).
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the FEH states that a capital-abundant coun-
try has a comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive goods. Therefore,
the FEH consequently implies that the TTIP implementation could be beneficial for the
environment only in the labor-abundant countries.
However, the most recent literature pioneered by Antweiler et al. (2001), focuses on
determining the comparative advantage in a country by simultaneously analyzing the pol-
lution haven motives and the FEH. A typical TTIP member is poorer, more densely pop-
ulated, and more labor-abundant than the U.S. Consequently, at least theoretically, the
adoption of TTIP should produce ambiguous effects. This is because, in line with the pol-
lution haven hypothesis based on national income differences (henceforth, PHH1), one
should observe an environmental degradation in the relatively poor countries such as Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, and Greece to name a few. On the other hand, since the latter three
countries tend to be more densely populated and more labor-abundant than the U.S., the
pollution haven hypothesis based on national population density variations (henceforth,
PHH2) and the FEH dictate that one should observe an increase (decrease) of the produc-
tion of pollution-intensive goods in the U.S (above three countries). The latter effect then
implies a positive impact of TTIP on the environment of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece,
and a negative one for the environment of the U.S., respectively. Thus, the implementation
of TTIP, at least theoretically, should denigrate the environment in a typical EU member
(the U.S.), only if PHH1 dominates (is dominated by) FEH and PHH2.4
Whether on average the implementation of TTIP benefits or denigrates the environ-
ment remains an empirical question. This paper aims to provide a definite answer to this
question. Therefore, using data over the 1989-2013 time period and for the current 28
EU members and the U.S., this study empirically investigates the possible impact of TTIP
on the per capita pollution emissions of CO2 and GHGs, respectively. The study focuses on
3The empirical evidence suggests that capital-intensive (labor-intensive) goods are pollution-intensive
(environmentally-friendly) goods in relative terms, holding everything else constant.
4This is true since a typical EU member is poorer, more densely populated and more labor-abundant than
the U.S.
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these two air pollutants not only because of data availability but also because environmen-
talists consider CO2 and GHGs as the two main sources of man-made global warming.
The present work uses several panel data econometric techniques to evaluate the ef-
fects of the implementation of TTIP on the environment. The approach follows the work of
Antweiler et al. (2001). Thus, the empirical analysis employs not only fixed and random
effects but also fixed effects where the errors are robust to cross-sectional dependence and
serial correlation, respectively. In addition, the study acknowledges the potential endo-
geneity problems between per capita emissions and trade and between per capita emis-
sions and income per capita, respectively. Thus, to avoid the endogeneity between per
capita emissions and income as well as the contemporaneous collinearity between trade
and income, the base specification uses the second lag of income instead of its contem-
poraneous value. Next, the empirical analysis performs two robustness checks. First, one
robustness check uses the second lag of trade as an instrument to avoid the potential en-
dogeneity between per capita emissions and trade. Consequently, this specification uses
the third lag of income. Further, similar to Frankel and Rose (2005), a second robustness
check instruments trade with a set of exogenous variables including lagged income, ex-
change rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and
four dummies (for whether a country uses the Euro, or has sea access, or uses English as
its official language, or is poor). The main results remain surprisingly strong independent
of the employed empirical strategy.
Overall, the study finds robust and statistically significant evidence suggesting that the
implementation of TTIP may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs. More
specifically, holding all other factors constant, the paper shows that, on average, a one per-
cent increase in the bilateral trade between the U.S. and the typical EU member may help
reduce per capita emission of CO2 and GHGs in the typical TTIP country by about 2.7 and
2.4 percent, respectively. This represents an important result because of its implications
on the ongoing discussions and negotiations between the high-ranking officials of the EU
and the U.S. It is also a surprising result since most of the literature provides empirical
evidence that free trade is generally associated with higher per capita emissions of CO2.
Moreover, historical evidence has shown that it is very unlikely for the CO2 or GHGs based
pollution issues to be addressed only by enforcing regulations at the national level. Thus,
many environmental economists perceive CO2 or GHGs based pollution as a pure global
externality.
However, the possible TTIP adoption may not have a uniform impact on the environ-
ment of each treaty member. This is more apparent in the case of GHGs. For instance, the
empirical evidence shows that the implementation of TTIP could be associated with lower
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GHGs emissions in a typical EU country, but with higher GHGs emissions in the U.S. In
particular, one percent increase of trade (imports plus exports over GDP) between the U.S.
and EU could lead to about 2.5 percent higher per capita emissions of GHGs in the U.S. In
contrast, the evidence shows an across the board reduction of GHGs for almost all EU mem-
bers (see Table 9 for more details). This result indicates that the implementation of TTIP
may shift per capita emissions of GHGs from the EU towards the U.S. Interestingly, this
result contradicts the popular belief (or fear) that EU members have towards the impact
of TTIP. One can easily confirm the European public concern about the environmental im-
pact of TTIP in the general media coverage as compared to the one in the U.S.5 In general,
Europeans believe that the environmental standards imposed in their countries, or at least
in each of the original EU15 members, are more stringent than those in the U.S. Therefore,
the EU seems concerned that the implementation of TTIP may force its members to reduce
their standards. However, empirical evidence in this study suggests the opposite.
Further, for the case of CO2 , the empirical exercise confirms a beneficial impact of TTIP
because the FEH appears to dominate the PHH1. As mentioned, a typical EU member is
more labor-abundant, poorer and more densely populated than the U.S. In the case of
CO2, on average, the results show that PHH2 is not generally statistically significant.6 The
reasoning for this finding has to do with the fact that the U.S. is richer and applies environ-
mentally friendlier technologies as compared to a typical EU member. At the same time,
according to the FEH and given that the average EU member is labor-abundant compared
to the U.S., the implementation of TTIP reduces the production of capital-intensive goods
and increases the production of labor-intensive goods in the typical EU country. Thus, de-
spite the fact that a typical EU member may not use environmentally friendly technologies
due to PHH1, its overall per capita emissions of CO2 fall because of its national reduction
of domestic production of capital-intensive goods. Further, since labor-intensive goods are
considered relatively clean-goods, the use of backward and non-environmentally friendly
technologies may not be associated with very high per capita CO2 emissions.
Moreover, the results highlight that the implementation of TTIP, on average, will re-
duce per capita emissions of GHGs. The effect comes from the observation that FEH and
PHH2 dominate PHH1.7 The accompanying figures in the empirical section confirm this
5 For instance, one can compare the information provided in http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ttip/ vs the one in https://ustr.gov/ttip.
6On the other hand, the Appendix Figures show that PHH2 could possibly verify for only four countries,
which are to the right of Lithuania (Estonia, the U.S., Sweden, and Finland). This result is more apparent
when comparing Finland and Sweden on one side with the U.S. on the other.
7Note that a typical EU member country is poorer and more densely populated as compared to the U.S.
Thus, a poor country may act as pollution haven because it adopts lax environmental laws. On the other
hand, the U.S. may act as pollution haven because it is sparsely populated as compared to an average EU
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observation. One may note the much stronger evidence for PHH1 and PHH2 in the case of
GHGs.8
In addition, the empirical results provide robust and statistically significant evidence
suggesting that the implementation of TTIP on average, may benefit more the environment
of the poor countries than that of the rich ones. The intuition for this result stems from
the fact that the poor countries may see a more rapid adoption of environmentally friendly
technologies due to the foreign direct investment spillover effects. Further, an increased
public awareness of the risks of pollution may also play a role. Furthermore, all the poor
EU members are more labor abundant than the rich EU members are relative to the U.S.
Thus, increased trade between the poor EU members and the U.S. may benefit the former
(despite the existence of lax environmental regulations in those countries) because TTIP
would relocate the production of the capital-intensive goods towards the U.S.9
The empirical exercise focuses on the importance of PHH2 by omitting the variables as-
sociated with this motive (see model M1) in the first regression and then introducing those
variables in the second regression (see Model M2). For the case of GHGs, the results show
that PHH2 is very important for Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. In particular, in the absence of PHH2, it may seem that in
the U.S., the implementation of TTIP could be beneficial to the environment because PHH1
dominates FEH. However, when model M2 introduces the PHH2, the evidence shows that
the implementation of TTIP could, in fact, denigrate the environment in the U.S.
Additional findings indicate that the implementation of TTIP in countries that use En-
glish as an official language and/or Euro as the official currency reduces per capita emis-
sions of CO2 less than in countries that do not do so. Moreover, evidence suggests that for
countries with sea or ocean access, TTIP reduces per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs
more than in countries that are landlocked.10
member. In conclusion, in the case of GHGs, the U.S. may act as a pollution haven if PHH1 is dominated
by PHH2. Moreover, if this is the case, then FEH may further denigrate the environment in the U.S. since
the latter is a capital-abundant country as compared to a typical EU member. The empirical results confirm
this argument since they show statistically significant evidence suggesting that one percent increase in the
bilateral trade between the U.S. and EU increases per capita emission of GHGs by about 2.5 percent per year
in the U.S.
8This may be related to the fact that GHGs contain other air pollutants in addition to CO2. In particular,
GHGs also contain CH4(methane), NO2 (nitrogen dioxide), CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons), HFCs (hydrofluoro-
carbons), PFCs (perfluorocarbons), and SF6 (sulfur hexafluoride). The online appendix to the paper entitled
“Other Pollutants” shows that in a typical TTIP member, the implementation of TTIP will reduce per capita
emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (fluorinated gases) and NO2.
9The Figures in the empirical section show that for GHGs and CO2 and for the countries that are more
developed than the typical TTIP member, the FEH starts to vanish after a certain point. In addition, in certain
countries, the opposite situation occurs when PHH1 dominates FEH.
10However, it should be noted that, on average, countries that use English as the official language and/or
Euro as the official currency are more developed than countries that do not do so. Therefore, this result may
6
Finally, an additional empirical exercise calculates the changes in social costs related
to the changes in total CO2 emissions due to one percent increase in bilateral trade. We
provide statistically significant evidence suggesting that on average, an increase of one
percent in annual bilateral trade between the U.S. and a typical EU member, could reduce
social costs by approximately 220 million U.S. Dollars per year (or by about 8 dollars per
person each year). The empirical section details the computation of these social costs for
each participating country both in absolute value and as a percentage of GDP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 describes our dataset and its sources. Section 4 presents the three main re-
gression designs. Section 5 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents our
empirical results. Section 7 provides some robustness checks. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Copeland and Taylor (2004) provide an excellent comprehensive review of the interna-
tional trade and environmental literature. According to them, the recent burgeoning liter-
ature on the effects of international trade on the environment has its roots in the pioneer-
ing work of Grossman and Krueger (1993). Other important papers in this literature in-
clude among others, Anderson et al. (1992), Antweiler et al. (2001), Chichilnisky (1994),
Cole and Elliott (2003), Copeland and Taylor (1994), Copeland and Taylor (1995), Dean
(2002), Frankel and Rose (2005), Grossman and Krueger (1995), and (Mani and Cunha,
2011).
One can interpret the adoption of TTIP as a reduction of the geographical distance
between North America and Europe, and therefore, as an intensification of the volume of
international trade between them. Consequently, one would expect an increase in produc-
tion, with cheaper prices for traded goods, and therefore with increased consumption in
both the U.S. and the EU Thus, pollution levels in all TTIP member countries may increase
due to the increased national production and higher national per capita income, respec-
tively. The environmental economics literature calls this phenomenon the scale effect.
Antweiler et al. (2001), Frankel and Rose (2005), Grossman and Krueger (1993), Gross-
man and Krueger (1995) among others provide robust empirical evidence of the existence
of the scale effect in the case of SO2.
At the same time, the adoption of TTIP may change the production methods for many
goods via the technique effect. The latter effect works in two ways. First, trade liberaliza-
be more related to the level of development than to the use of the same currency or language. However, this
is not the case for countries that have sea access relative to landlocked countries.
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tion could create positive technological spillover effects. This is especially seen in develop-
ing countries, where domestic firms might take advantage of cleaner available technolo-
gies. Second, consumers may see environmental quality as a normal good. This, in turn,
may lead to an increase in per capita income and to higher preferences for goods with
better environmental quality. Antweiler et al. (2001), Frankel and Rose (2005), Grossman
and Krueger (1993), Grossman and Krueger (1995) among others provide robust empirical
evidence for the existence of the technique effect in the case of SO2.
In addition to the scale and technique effects, trade liberalization may create a com-
position effect. This refers to changes in pollution levels due to changes in the relative
shares of different goods in the aggregate national production. The composition effect re-
lates to the empirical evidence that relative capital-intensive goods are pollution-intensive
goods (see, for example, Mani and Wheeler (1997), Antweiler et al. (1998) , Antweiler
et al. (2001), and Cole and Elliott (2003)). Thus, trade liberalization generates economic
growth, which in turn generates more physical (human) capital accumulation and thus
increases the national physical (human) capital. The latter will increase the overall pro-
duction of the capital-intensive (labor-intensive) goods and therefore increase (decrease)
national pollution emissions.
Grossman and Krueger (1995) find that while national income per capita increases,
NAFTA raises SO2 emission levels via the combination of the above three effects in the case
of low-income countries, but lowers them in the case of high-income countries. This find-
ing provides a unique relationship between trade liberalization and pollution levels and
aligns with the claim that NAFTA produces an inverted-U shaped environmental Kuznets
curve (EKC), between economic growth and SO2 emission levels (see Copeland and Taylor
(2004) and Dean (1992) for a comprehensive review on comparing the scale, technique
and composition effects).
One part of the trade and environment literature agrees with either a Ricardian and/or
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. In other words, liberalized trade forces a
country to produce more of the goods at which they are relatively better suited and to im-
port the rest of the goods from foreign countries. This changes the composition of national
aggregate production, whereby each country increases the production of goods at which
they enjoy a comparative advantage. Thus, if a country has a comparative advantage in
goods that are produced with relatively cleaner technologies, trade liberalization would
expand these cleaner industries and lead to lower pollution levels. As indicated earlier,
since the pollution-intensive goods tend to be capital-intensive goods, one would expect
an increase of national pollution levels in the capital-abundant countries (e.g., Italy, Aus-
tria, and Luxembourg are capital-abundant when compared to the U.S.). Consequently,
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one would expect a fall of pollution levels in labor-abundant countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, Greece, and Portugal to name a few). The trade and environmental literature call
this the FEH. Grossman and Krueger (1993) use data on SO2 to provide empirical evidence
that the implementation of NAFTA is consistent with the FEH. In particular, Grossman and
Krueger (1993) show a decrease in SO2 emission levels in Mexico, which is relatively labor-
abundant, at least when compared to the U.S. Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Rayner
(2000), Jaffe et al. (1995), Low and Yeats (1992), Tobey (1990), Xu (1999), and Walter
(1973) provide more empirical evidence in support of the FEH.
Another branch of the trade and environment literature examines what is known as
the PHH1. According to this hypothesis, the adoption of TTIP increases pollution in low-
income countries because the latter tend to have lax environmental standards or non-
effective implementation policies towards clean industries. For example, the group of
former communist EU countries and of some southern European ones could have a com-
parative advantage in a dirty industry and thus export pollution-intensive goods to the
U.S. since the former has lower incomes than the latter (i.e., the U.S.). Baumol and Oates
(1988), Chichilnisky (1994), Copeland and Taylor (1994), Copeland and Taylor (1995),
Grossman and Krueger (1995), McGuire (1982), Pethig (1976), and Siebert et al. (1980)
provide robust and simple theoretical models in the support of PHH1. Thus, at least theo-
retically, PHH1 implies that the U.S. should expect a reduction of pollution levels due to its
participation in TTIP, while Slovenia and Greece among others should expect an increase
in pollution levels. However, not many papers in the trade and environment literature sup-
port the PHH1. For example, the literature review in Jaffe et al. (1995) concludes there is
little empirical support for PHH1 and that only a few studies appear to contradict this con-
clusion. However, Ederington et al. (2004) claims that the lack of evidence for PHH1 could
be related to the possible existence of simultaneity between the stringency of environmen-
tal regulations and pollution and to the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. More recently,
empirical studies that control for the last two econometric issues, find empirical evidence
in support of PHH1.11Muradian et al. (2002), Cole (2003), Ederington and Minier (2003),
Levinson (2003), Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) and Levinson and Taylor (2008) are
some examples.
A different stream of the literature tests the pollution haven hypothesis using a differ-
11The present paper does not distinguish between the terms “effect” and “hypothesis” when referring to
PHH1, even though some other studies do. The current study refers to PHH1 as the situation where the
implementation of TTIP increases the production of dirty goods in the relatively poorer trade partners. This
study proxies the latter by using the interaction of the trade variable with the relative income variable and
with its covariables. However, the classical PHH1 simply claims that the implementation of a trade agreement
(such as TTIP) would relocate the dirtiest firms from the rich trading partners to the poor ones. The present
study proxies the latter with a measure of FDI.
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ent approach. For example, Frankel and Rose (2005) use an inverted density measure
that they call land per capita in order to test PHH2. They claim that trade liberalization
may increase the production of pollution-intensive goods in low density populated areas
and decrease it in high-density populated areas via the classical comparative advantage
argument. Therefore, the low-density populated areas that may have less stringent envi-
ronmental standards have the potential to become pollution havens.12 However, Frankel
and Rose (2005) find no empirical evidence in support of PHH2.
Antweiler et al. (2001) claims that previous empirical studies have found conflicting
evidence not only because of data limitation and/or quality but also because these studies
were trying to establish a unique relationship between international trade and environ-
ment across all countries. However, a country’s comparative advantage, as shown above,
could result both from the pollution haven and from the FEH. Both of these effects produce
pollution levels that move in opposite directions and/or cancel out in the case of the rela-
tively rich and capital-intensive countries. Thus, the implementation of TTIP, at least theo-
retically, reduces the pollution emissions in Luxembourg (Lithuania) for instance, if PHH1
dominates (is being dominated by) FEH. Antweiler et al. (2001) breaks down the compo-
sition effects of international trade into FEH and PHH1 and shows empirically that trade
liberalization lowers pollution emissions. The dataset in this paper includes for the most
part countries that are relatively poorer and more labor-abundant than the U.S. Therefore,
for these countries, PHH1 should increase their national pollution emissions while FEH
should reduce their national pollution emissions.
In the context of the impact of trade liberalization on global warming, environmental
economists focus more on the effects of additional trade on per capita emissions of CO2
(e.g., since the latter is considered to be the most important air pollutant associated with
global warming), or GHGs, in general. In the case of CO2 various empirical papers such as
(Cole, 2003) or (Shapiro, 2016) provide robust evidence that trade liberalization increases
per capita emissions of CO2. While Managi et al. (2009) arrive at the same conclusion, they
also provide empirical evidence that trade may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2
for OECD countries.
3 Data Description and their Sources
The current study employs a dataset that covers the current 28 EU member countries and
the U.S. over a period of 25 years from 1989 until 2013. Table 1 lists these countries.
12The dataset in this study includes only two countries, namely Finland and Sweden, that have relatively
higher land per capita than the U.S.
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Our models denote Carbon Dioxide with CO2, which is probably the most discussed and
often cited indicator of climate change and global warming. According to NRC (2010),
CO2 is the primary GHGs contributor.13 The Edgar database supplies the data for CO2.14
The Edgar database measures CO2 in metric tons (Mg) per capita emissions. According to
NRC (2010) “CO2 is the primary greenhouse gas emitted through human activities. In 2013,
CO2 accounted for about 82% of all of GHGs emissions from human activities in the U.S.
CO2 is naturally present in the atmosphere as part of the Earth’s carbon cycle (the natural
circulation of carbon among the atmosphere, oceans, soil, plants, and animals). Human
activities are altering the carbon cycle—both by adding more CO2 to the atmosphere and by
influencing the ability of natural sinks, like forests, to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. 15
While CO2 is the largest contributor to GHGs, it is only one of several poisonous gases
emitted into the atmosphere. Others include methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), chlo-
13NRC (2010) claims that “human activities currently release over 30 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere
every year. This build-up in the atmosphere is like a tub filling with water, where more water flows from the
faucet than the drain can take away... When sunlight reaches Earth’s surface, it can either be reflected back into
space or absorbed by Earth. Once absorbed, the planet releases some of the energy back into the atmosphere as
heat (also called infrared radiation). GHGs like H2O, CO2, and CH4 absorb energy, slowing or preventing the
loss of heat to space. In this way, GHGs act like a blanket, making Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.
This process is commonly known as the greenhouse effect.” Moreover, CO2 is also a significant contributor to
ocean acidification as it dissolves into water carbonic acid is created.
14EDGAR v4.2, European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)/PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency. Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), release version 4.2.
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europe.eu, 2011; EDGARv4.2FT2012, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
(JRC)/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Re-
search (EDGAR), release version 4.2. http://edgar.jrc.ec.europe.eu, 2014; BP (2011-2014) BP Statistical
Review of World Energy 2011-2014. Internet: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-
economics/statisticalreview-of-world-energy.html, June 2014.
15According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the main human sources for emissions of
CO2 come from the combustion of coal, natural gas, and oil for energy and transportation. Other important
human sources concern various land use changes and industrial processes. In particular, in the U.S. in 2013
fossil fuel combustion from certain industrial processes accounted for about 15% of its total CO2 emissions
and 12% of total GHGs emissions. A significant source of CO2 emissions caused by industrial processes comes
from the cement manufacturing process. Other important human industrial sources of CO2 emissions come
from the production process of several chemicals, or from the production of metals such as steel and iron.
The second largest human source of CO2 emissions (which in the U.S. in 2013 accounted for about 31% of
total CO2 emissions and 26% of total U.S. GHGs emissions) is represented by various modern methods of
goods and human transportation means such as marine (ships), rail (trains), air (airplanes) and land (cars,
trucks, buses) means. However, the most significant human source of CO2 emissions is the combustion of
fossil fuels to generate electricity, which is generally used to power homes, businesses, and various industries.
For example, in the U.S. in 2013 this source accounted for about 37% of total CO2 emissions and 31% of
total U.S. GHGs emissions. According to NRC (2010), atmospheric CO2 concentrations have increased by
almost 40% since pre-industrial times, from approximately 280 parts per million by volume (ppmv) in the
18th century to 390 ppmv in 2010. The current CO2 level is higher than it has been in at least 800,000 years.
In the U.S. during the 1989-2013 time period, CO2 emissions have increased by about 7%. The U.S. EPA
claims that the increase in CO2 emissions is mainly due to two main factors: 1) an increase in energy use by
an expanding economy and population and an overall growth in emissions from electricity generation and
2) an increase in miles traveled by motor vehicles.
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rofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs), per-fluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6). These gases can have significant impacts on human health, global
warming, ecosystems, volatile weather and economic output. We obtain the data for GHGs
from UNFCCC. They are in Tg in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions.
A measure of trade intensity, which is similar to Antweiler et al. (2001) constitutes the
main variable of interest. The IMF database provides data on the volume of bilateral trade
(imports and exports) between each EU member and the U.S. and on each country’s real
GDP measured in 2005 U.S. Dollars. In particular, the paper denotes this measure of trade
intensity with T and measures it by dividing the sum of exports and imports to GDP. In the
case of the U.S., T sums each EU country’s exports to the U.S. to find the imports of the US
from the EU, and each EU country’s imports from the U.S. to find the exports of the U.S.
towards the EU.16
The study finds real GDP per capita by dividing a country’s real GDP to its population.
In order to avoid the possible dual causality problem between pollution and income, the
paper constructs and employs the three-year moving average of lagged real GDP per capita
instead of a contemporaneous measure. We simply call this measure income per capita and
denote it with I.17 The IMF (2015) database supplies the data for real GDP per capita.18
The paper uses bilateral nominal exchange rates to measure GDP in real 2005 U.S. Dollars.
Relative real GDP per capita, denoted as RI, is found by dividing each country’s real GDP
per capita to the corresponding U.S. real GDP per capita. Table (3) provides more detailed
information about this measure, while the Appendix figures provide a visual description.
Both Table (3) and the figures show that with the exception of Denmark, Luxembourg, and
Sweden, all countries in the sample are poorer than the U.S.19
The PENN World Tables 8.0 supply the capital to labor ratio data.20 The paper denotes
it with KL and measures it in current PPPs 2005 billion U.S. Dollars by dividing the physical
capital stock to the labor force (the latter being measured in thousands).21 The relative
16Thus, for each EU member i, Ti =
(
Xi+Mi
GDPi
)
, where Xi and Mi denote each EU country’s exports and
imports with the U.S., respectively. In the case of the U.S., XU.S. = ∑i Mi and MU.S. = ∑i Xi, respectively.
Thus, the measurement unit is as a percentage of GDP.
17More specifically, the paper constructs it as: Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−3 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−4. The empirical
section demonstrates the better measurement properties of this weighting scheme over an equally weighted
one.
18The IMF has since January 2015 made all of its data available at www.imf.org.
19Since the U.S. is the benchmark, RI will be 1 for the U.S. Only Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden have
RI>1. This means that in the figures of interest, the rest of the countries will be to the left of the vertical
line, which corresponds to the RI of the U.S.
20Feenstra et al. (2015) provides a statistical overview and analysis of the data in PENN Tables 8.0.
21Alternative measures exist. In particular, one could measure the national labor force by using the na-
tional persons engaged or the national working hours or an education index (i.e., the latter comes from
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capital to labor ratio variable, denoted by RKL, computes by dividing each country’s capital
to labor ratio to that of the U.S. Table (3) and the Appendix figures provide more detailed
information on this measure.22 Both Table (3) and the figures confirm that with the ex-
ception of Austria, Italy, and Luxembourg, all other countries in the sample have a KL ratio
lower than that of the U.S.
The annual ratio of the stock of inward Foreign Direct Investment to the physical stock
of capital in each country provides a relative FDI measure. The IMF (2015) database
supplies again the data for the stock of inward FDI, measured in real 2005 U.S. Dollars. The
PENN World Tables 8.0 provide the data for the physical stock of capital, also expressed in
2005 constant U.S. Dollars.
LPC denotes land area per capita. The CIA World Factbook (2015) sources the land
information in square kilometers.23 The population, on the other hand, varies over time
and across countries. The IMF (2015) database provides the population in millions. LPC
writes as the annual log-ratio of the land area of each country to its population. The
relative land area per capita variable, denoted by RLPC, writes as the ratio of each country’s
land per capita to the land area per capita in the U.S.24 Table (3) and the Appendix figures
show that only Finland and Sweden are more sparsely populated than the U.S. (i.e., RLPC
>1).
Sea dummy denotes a dummy variable that is 1 for landlocked countries, while T(Sea
Dummy) interacts Trade with this dummy variable. The sample in the study includes only
five countries that are landlocked (i.e., Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg,
and Slovakia, respectively). English refers to a dummy variable that is 1 for the countries
that have English as an official language. Only four countries in the dataset score a 1 for
this variable (i.e., the U.S., the UK, Ireland and Malta). Euro denotes a dummy variable
that switches to 1 beginning with the year in which a country has officially adopted the
Euro.25 T(Euro) refers to the interaction between Trade and this dummy variable.
Table (4) provides the summary statistics of our variables of interest. In particular, one
may note that on average the relative KL, I and LPC ratios are at 71.1%, 56.2%, and 43.7%
Barro/Lee data set in the PENN World Tables). However, irrespective of the alternatives measure one could
use, the main results stand. These are available upon request from the authors.
22The labor-abundant countries locate to the left of the U.S., while the capital-abundant countries locate
to the right of the U.S. For the latter, RKL > 1.
23The CIA World Factbook is public and available online at https://www.cia.gov.
24Thus, RLPCi= LPCi/LPCU.S.. The countries that are more densely populated than the U.S. have
RLPC<1.
25The Euro was officially launched on January 1, 1999. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain were the initial members of the Eurozone.
Greece followed in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Slovakia in 2009, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, and finally Estonia
in 2011.
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of those of the U.S., respectively. Bilateral trade with the U.S. is on average 3.71% of the
GDP of the typical EU country. The stock of FDI is 13.2% of the stock of capital. The
average annual income per capita is 22,716 real 2005 U.S. Dollars per capita, while the KL
ratio is on average 158,455 real 2005 U.S. Dollars. Overall, the means are relatively close
to their median, which indicates a low degree of skewness.
4 Three Estimating Equations
Throughout, subscripts t and i indicate the year (1989 through 2013) and country, respec-
tively. Zit denotes per capita emissions of the two pollutant measures (i.e., CO2it ,GHGsit).
The construction of the three econometric models follows the works of Antweiler et al.
(2001) and Frankel and Rose (2005). First, following Antweiler et al. (2001), the paper
investigates the relationship between per capita emissions of each pollutant and: 1) the
trade effect, which is split into (i) the FEH and (ii) the PHH1, 2) levels and squares of per
capita income levels to investigate the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve (i.e.,
EKC), 3) the direct composition effect of growth, and 4) the composition effect of growth.
Model 1 (M1) writes in the following way
E (Zit) = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+β1 Iit + β2 I2it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it + β5 I (KL)it + eit (1)
where θi denotes the country-specific constant term, ξt denotes the time-specific con-
stant term, and eit denotes an idiosyncratic measurement error term. Model 1 employs a
set of five trade-based explanatory variables. In particular, M1 uses 1) the trade variable, T
as a measurement of trade intensity, 2) the interaction of trade intensity with the relative
capital to labor ratio, denoted by T(RKL), in order to detect the FEH, 3) the interaction of
trade intensity with the squared relative capital to labor ratio denoted by T(RKL)2 in order
to account for the diminishing FEH at the margin, 4) the interaction of trade intensity
with relative per capita income, denoted by T(RI), in order to investigate PHH1 and 5) the
interaction of trade intensity with squared relative per capita income, denoted by T(RI)2,
in order to account for diminishing PHH1 at the margin.
The lagged national income per capita I captures the effect of economic growth on
the environment. The above specification does not separate the scale from the technique
effects of growth since the pollution data are in terms of per capita emission levels. There-
fore, the income per capita variable measures both the scale and technique effects. The
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specialized literature calls this the scale-technique effect (see Cole (2003) and Managi
et al. (2009), among others).26 The inclusion of the squared lagged income denoted by
I2 allows for the investigation of the possible existence of an EKC. Thus, a positive and
statistically significant β1 and a negative and statistically significant β2 would confirm the
empirical validity of the EKC.
To measure the direct composition effect of growth or the importance of national
capital-abundance, M1 adds the level and the square of the capital to labor ratio (i.e.,
KL and (KL)2, respectively). (KL)2 accounts for the diminishing effect of capital accumula-
tion at the margin. The cross-product of income per capita and capital to labor ratio (i.e.,
I(KL)) measures the general composition of growth.
Further, the slopes α2 and α3 measure the FEH and the slopes α4 and α5 measure the
PHH1, respectively. Theoretically, according to the FEH, TTIP should produce a posi-
tive sign of α2 for a relatively capital-abundant country, as compared to the U.S. For
example, since Italy, Austria, and Luxembourg are relatively capital-abundant countries,
while Poland and Slovenia are relatively-labor-abundant countries, the U.S. should import
capital-intensive goods from Italy, Austria, and Luxembourg and labor-intensive goods
from Poland and Slovenia. Consequently, the implementation of TTIP will increase per
capita pollution levels in Italy, Austria, and Luxembourg, but decrease them in Poland and
Slovenia.
On the other hand, along with the lines of PHH1, TTIP should theoretically produce a
positive sign of α4 for Bulgaria and Romania, because relatively poorer countries design
and implement lax environmental regulations as compared to their trading partner, the
U.S. (see for example Dasgupta et al. (2001)). Analogously, TTIP should theoretically
produce a negative sign of α4 for Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden because relatively
richer countries design and implement stringent environmental regulations as compared
to the U.S. Most EU members are poorer than the U.S., and therefore, potential pollution
havens when compared to the U.S.27 The existence of the PHH1 in this setting falls under
the Heckscher-Ohlin model as described in Antweiler et al. (2001), Copeland and Taylor
(2004), Pethig (1976)and Siebert et al. (1980).28
26To separately identify the two effects, one would need data on concentrations of pollution. Using the
latter, some studies separate the scale from the technique effect by using GDP per square kilometer for major
cities to capture the scale effect (see for example, Antweiler et al. (2001), and Panayotou (1997)) and per
capita income to measure the technique effect. Unfortunately, the data collection process did not find the
required concentrations for the countries under study.
27Some countries, such as the former Communist countries have always been much poorer than the U.S.
However, other countries in the sample, such as the majority of the first EU15 members for instance, are just
slightly poorer than the U.S.
28Thus, the implementation of TTIP would theoretically force the poor countries to increase the production
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The trade intensity variable T together with its interactions with the other variables in
the model (i.e., the slopes of α1 to α5) measures the overall impact of trade on pollution.
Theoretically, one would expect to find that TTIP reduces per capita emissions of CO2 and
GHGs in the U.S. if the rise of emissions per capita due to the FEH is outweighed by the
fall of per capita emissions due to PHH1. According to Antweiler et al. (2001), one would
unambiguously expect that TTIP increases per capita pollution emissions for a relatively
capital-abundant and poor country (such as Italy or Austria when compared to the U.S.)
because FEH goes in the same direction as PHH1. Similarity, TTIP should unambiguously
decrease per capita pollution emissions for a relatively labor-abundant and rich country
(such as Denmark or Sweden when compared to the U.S.) because FEH and PHH1 move
in the same direction. However, for the rest of the countries, the implementation of TTIP
should lead to an ambiguous effect of trade on the per capita emission levels. Since most
countries in this study are labor-abundant and poor relative to the U.S., the implementa-
tion of TTIP should reduce pollution in the labor-abundant countries according to the FEH
and simultaneously increase pollution in the poor countries due to the PHH1. Whether
FEH dominates or not PHH1 remains an empirical question.
Following the work of Frankel and Rose (2005), model 2 (M2) adds another proxy
to capture the pollution haven hypothesis. In particular, M2 adds levels and squares of
an inverse measure of national population density such as the land per capita (i.e., total
square kilometers per number of inhabitants). M2 uses the coefficients associated with
these terms to test the validity of PHH2. In addition to these two variables, M2 adds the
inward stock of FDI as a percentage of overall national physical capital. M2 then writes in
the following way
E (Zit) = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+α6T (RLPC)it + α7T (RLPC)
2
it + β1 Iit + β2 I
2
it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it
+β5 I (KL)it + β6FDIit + β7LPCit + β8(LPC)
2
it + eit (2)
M2 proposes to investigate the existence of the pollution haven hypothesis using a dif-
ferent channel than M1 does. In this setting, the relatively low (as compared to the trading
partner) national population density can trace the origins of lax environmental standards.
In particular, the signs of the two slopes α6 and α7 (i.e., the slope coefficients of the cross
of pollution-intensive goods due to the existence of lax environmental regulations (as a consequence of being
poor). In other words, relative income works in an analogous way to the relative capital to labor ratio.
Models 2 and 3 use the FDI measure to test for the existence of a delocation of production from a rich
country to a poor one.
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product of trade and of the relative land area per capita and its square, respectively) test
the empirical validity of PHH2. Table (3) underlines that with the exception of Finland and
Sweden, most countries in this dataset are more densely populated than the U.S. There-
fore, the PPH2 according to Frankel and Rose (2005) suggests that Finland and Sweden
should have laxer environmental standards than the U.S. Therefore, holding everything
else constant, TTIP should increase per capita emissions in Finland and Sweden and de-
crease them in the U.S. On the other hand, PHH2 also suggests that all other EU member
countries will have relatively more stringent environmental standards than the U.S. Thus,
the implementation of TTIP should decrease per capita emission of CO2 and GHGs in these
EU countries but increase them in the U.S.
Moreover, TTIP may affect per capita emission levels because of a globalization effect.
For instance, a country’s degree of openness or globalization should affect the way in
which TTIP affects the environment. Following this reasoning, model 3 (M3) writes in the
following way
E (Zit) = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+α6T (RLPC)it + α7T (RLPC)
2
it + α8T(Sea dummy)it + α9T(Euro dummy)it
+α10T(English dummy)it + β1 Iit + β2 I2it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it + β5 I (KL)it
+β6FDIit + β7LPCit + β8(LPC)2it + eit (3)
More specifically, M3 includes a dummy for sea access denoted Sea dummy and inter-
acts it with T. The international trade literature argues that a major regional free trade
agreement such as TTIP will intensify bilateral trade more for the countries that have sea
or ocean access. Only five countries in this dataset do not have sea access. These are Aus-
tria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, respectively. Similarly, whether
some countries adhere to a currency union such as the euro may matter too. Theoretically,
ceteris paribus, one would expect more trade between the U.S. and the EU countries that
are also part of the Eurozone. Therefore, in order to capture the Euro effect, M3 adds
the euro dummy denoted with Euro dummy and interacts it with T. Analogously, the use
of English as an official language may also be important. Thus, M3 proposes an English
dummy simply denoted with English dummy and interacts it with T. Theoretically, holding
everything else constant one would expect more trade between the U.S. and the three EU
countries where English is an official language. These countries are the UK, Ireland, and
Malta, respectively.
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5 Empirical Methodology
Since some of the dependent and independent variables lack observations for all entities
and all years, the empirical exercise requires imputing some of the missing data. To this
end, this study uses the Amelia II program available in R. This program performs mul-
tiple imputations whereby several different “completed” datasets are obtained to reflect
the uncertainty in the data. The results are then recombined to obtain the final dataset.
The estimations in the study generally follow the default specifications (i.e., bootstrap five
different datasets which are then averaged to get the final series). However, in other cases
whereby the missing observations occur either at the very end or at the very beginning
of the sample and the series exhibits a clear monotonic trend, we employ a simple trend
regression to fill in the missing observations. Further, for the cases where there is only one
missing observation in the middle of the series, a simple averaging to fill in the data suf-
fices. Moreover, for the countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia that did not become
independent until 1993, we impute the data by using the information for Czechoslovakia
and using a “proportional” approach based on a counterfactual analysis. The Appendix
provides further details on the data imputation methods for the main variables employed
in the analysis.29
The tables of the next section present results that employ the usual random and fixed
effects approaches. However, in addition to the usual heteroskedastic robust standard
errors, the empirical section employs specifications that are robust to contemporaneous
cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation effects, respectively. In particular, for
the latter, the paper uses a fixed effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay serial correlation
robust standard errors that employ an MA(2) component. As indicated in the environmen-
tal literature, the serial correlation effects should be considered because the pollution and
macroeconomic variables usually display monotonic trends. Further, the Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier (BP/LM) test rejects a simple pooled OLS approach. Thus, to econo-
mize on space we omit the OLS results.
Concerning the main results, the evidence suggests that in most cases the estimators
across the random and fixed effects specifications, respectively are very similar in terms of
sign, significance, and magnitude. Finally, the study corrects for the possibility of cross-
sectional dependence by using such robust standard errors in a standard fixed effects
framework.
29For instance, for one of the main variables in the study, namely the trade measure, Amelia fills in the
missing observations by using a set of macro factors like GDP, employment, total population and the unem-
ployment rate that do not have any missing observations.
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The current study also investigates for the possible existence of unit roots. Thus, the last
column of Table 4 shows the results from applying the Im-Pesharan-Shin panel unit root
test. After controlling for a deterministic time trend, both pollutants and the explanatory
variables appear stationary.
6 Empirical Results
The empirical section shows the main results for each pollutant in separate tables. Tables
5 and 6 show the “base” results for GHGs and CO2, respectively. Each table reports the
estimation results using fixed effects for M1, M2 and M3 in the first, second and third
columns respectively and the estimation results of the same models, using random effects
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns, respectively. Further, the seventh, eighth and ninth
columns report the estimation results of the three models using cross-sectional fixed ef-
fects, while the tenth, eleventh and twelfth columns, respectively show the results using
serial correlation fixed effects (i.e., with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors).
Scale-Technique Effects and EKC: The 6th row of Tables 5 and 6 indicates the proxy of the
scale-technique effect as measured by the two period lagged three-year moving average of
income (real GDP) per capita. The 7th row reports its squared value in order to investigate
the existence of an EKC.30 Both rows show statistically significant evidence across most of
our models and estimation methods, consistent with the EKC argument.
Composition Effects: The 8th and 10th rows of Tables 5 and 6 report the direct compo-
sition effect of growth, as measured by the capital-labor ratio, and the composition effect
of growth, as measured by the cross product of income per capita and capital-labor ratio,
respectively. The 9th row includes the square of the capital-labor ratio in order to capture
the diminishing effect of capital accumulation at the margin. The evidence suggests that
the accumulation of capital decreases per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs, respectively.
This evidence appears strong especially in the case of the fixed effects and cross-section
specification of M3 in the case of GHGs, and almost in all specifications in the case of CO2.
Population Density Effects: The 14th row of Tables 5 and 6 reports the relationship
between the inverse measurement of population density, as proxied by land per capita
and pollution. Consistent with the environmental literature, the statistically significant
evidence confirms that population density (land per capita) reduces (increases) per capita
30We further analyze the existence of the EKC in a separate paper, where we also report the turning points.
This separate paper shows that for the two air pollutants above, the existence of the EKC is verified even
when adding variables from the political economy literature such as the GINI coefficient and various national
institutional measures. For more details see Pascalau and Qirjo (2017)
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pollution of GHGs and CO2, respectively. The second order effect appears especially strong
when the dependent variable is GHGs. This result is strongest for M2.
FDI Effects: M2 and M3 present the impact of FDI on pollution in the 13th row and
for each estimation method. Both models report a statistically significant and positive
relationship between the extent of FDI in an economy and per capita emissions of CO2
and GHGs. This may imply that multinational corporations may have chosen to move
their production to the poorer (relative to the U.S.) TTIP members because of the lax
environmental standards. This is consistent with the classical pollution haven hypothesis
(abbreviated PHH). PHH argues that some of the firms in rich countries choose to move up
entire plants (or just the dirtiest ones) to the relatively poor countries to take advantage
of their relatively lax environmental standards. In order to confirm the PHH, unreported
results employ a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the country is not part of the original
EU-15 countries, to find statistically significant evidence that one percentage point increase
in FDI from the U.S. to a typical non-EU-15 member is associated with an increase of per
capita emissions of GHGs of 5.8 percentage points.31 On the other hand, there is no
significant evidence indicating a relationship between FDI from the U.S. to a typical EU-15
member and per capita emissions of our pollutants.32
Factor Endowment Effects: The cross-product of trade intensity and relative capital to
labor ratio captures the FEH. The 2nd row of Tables 5 and 6 informs on the FEH via the
T(RKL) coefficient. The 3rd row has the squared term of the cross-product of trade and rel-
ative capital to labor ratio to account for the diminishing FEH at the margin. Theoretically,
the FEH suggests that the implementation of TTIP would denigrate the environment in
capital-abundant countries and be beneficial to the environment in labor-abundant coun-
tries. The signs and significance of the T(RKL) and T(RKL)2 coefficients support the FEH for
both CO2 and GHGs. This implies that assuming that capital-intensive goods are pollution-
intensive goods, a higher capital to labor ratio of a country relative to that of the U.S.
associates with higher per capita emissions of the two pollutants. However, this result
applies on average. In order to get a better taste of the FEH, one needs to focus on each
EU member’s trade elasticity and their capital to labor ratios relative to the U.S. Table 9
31However, this exercise does not yield statistically significant evidence in the case of CO2 emissions.
32Moreover, one would expect that PHH aligns with an increase in FDI in the non-EU-15 members due to
the existence of relatively lax environmental standards, not only because of higher poverty in those countries
relative the U.S. but also relative to the EU-15 members. For example, investigative articles comment on the
severity of deforestation in Romania to supply the global chain of IKEA (for more details see an WSJ ar-
ticle available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/ikea-gets-deeper-into-the-woods-1438310691). Therefore,
an additional source for the PHH may stem from the reallocation of dirty industries from the EU-15 to the
non-EU-15 members as a direct outcome of the higher trade between EU-15 members and the U.S., respec-
tively.
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shows trade elasticity coefficients.33 Thus, irrespective of the model used, it appears that
in the case of CO2 and for the countries to the left of Sweden, the higher the capital to
labor ratio, the higher the per capita emissions of CO2. The trade elasticities are markedly
negative for the poorer countries from the former Eastern European block (e.g., Lithuania,
Latvia, Poland, and Bulgaria). However, for the more advanced countries in the former
Eastern European block (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary), the elasticities appear positive
albeit small. Similarly, the set of figures corresponding to GHGs shows a positive relation-
ship between per capita emissions of GHGs and the relative to the U.S. capital-labor ratios,
for the countries to the left of Croatia. In this case, however, the relationship stays negative
for most of the countries in the analysis.
Pollution Haven Effects: The cross-product of trade intensity and relative income per
capita captures the PHH1. The 4th row in Tables 5 and 6 reports the coefficient of T(RI),
while the 5th reports the squared value to account for the diminishing PHH1 at the margin.
PHH1 argues that low-income countries adopt lax environmental standards, and therefore,
produce dirtier goods, while rich countries can afford to accommodate stringent environ-
mental laws and consequently produce cleaner goods. Thus, the implementation of TTIP
should increase exports of dirty goods from poor countries and increase exports of clean
goods from rich countries. On average, the statistically significant coefficients support the
PHH1 for both CO2 and GHGs, respectively. Therefore, on average, per capita emissions of
these two pollutants go down as countries get richer. Further, the elasticities of CO2 with
respect to trade conditioning on relative income show that for the countries to the right
of Slovenia and as countries get richer, their trade elasticity coefficients decrease slightly.
The poorest countries in the sample, such as Bulgaria and Romania appear to have the
lowest trade elasticities. However, this fact does not necessarily invalidate PHH1. It simply
indicates that in most TTIP members, either the FEH and/or the PHH2 dominate PHH1.
The evidence for GHGs also confirms the existence of PHH1. In particular, for the coun-
tries in the sample richer than Croatia, one percent increase in the bilateral trade with the
U.S. produces a negative relationship between relative income and per capita emission of
GHGs.34
As indicated above, an alternative method to test for the existence of the pollution
33To make sure the results are consistent, the Appendix figures (the ones in the middle) graph some of
these trade elasticity coefficients, where in the vertical axes, there are trade elasticities of each TTIP member
and the horizontal axes, there are the capital to labor ratios relative to the U.S. In particular, these figures
show the elasticities produced by the random effects specification of each of the three models.
34The polynomial fitting curve under M2 appears to have a different pattern than the ones in M1 and
M3, respectively. However, a closer inspection of the figure reveals that the trade elasticity coefficients are
roughly similar across the three models with several minor exceptions. See three figures on the top for CO2
and GHGs respectively.
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haven hypothesis uses the cross-product of trade intensity and relative land per capita. Un-
der this scenario, the implementation of TTIP may reallocate the production of dirty goods
from the densely populated trade partner towards the sparsely populated one. Conse-
quently, the less densely population countries may act as a pollution heaven. The evidence
in Tables 5 and 6 supports the PHH2, at least for GHGs. The corresponding elasticities
figures show that while in the case of CO2 there is initially a negative relationship between
the CO2 trade elasticity coefficient and the relative land per capita, this trade elasticity co-
efficient is positive as predicted for Sweden and Finland. These two countries are the only
ones with more land per capita than the U.S. Further, the corresponding figures for GHGs
demonstrate that for almost all countries on average, higher land per capita associates
with higher trade elasticities of per capita emissions.
Race to the bottom or gains from trade hypothesis: The trade intensity term T together
with all of its interactions with the other variables captures the overall impact of TTIP on
the environment. The evidence supports the existence of the gains from trade argument
for both pollutants. This constitutes the most important result of the paper. Moreover,
especially in the case of CO2, historical evidence has shown that regulation at the national
level may not be sufficient to reduce emissions levels. In the case of GHGs, a closer in-
spection of Table 6 shows that the beneficial effect of TTIP lies in the empirical fact that
FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1. Consequently, the implementation of TTIP reduces per
capita emissions of GHGs because of the reduction of pollution levels in the low income
and densely populated countries. Further, Table 6 suggests that the implementation of
TTIP reduces per capita emissions of CO2 because FEH dominates PHH1. The explanation
for the latter result lies with the delocation of the production of the capital-intensive goods
towards the U.S.
Trade Elasticity of CO2 and GHGs: While so far the focus has been on the slopes of Trade
and its interaction terms, a next step in the analysis seeks a better understanding of the
impact of trade on pollution. For this, Table 9 shows the elasticities of GHGs and CO2
with respect to trade (i.e., the percentage response of CO2 or GHGs due to a 1% increase
in Trade) for each country in the sample. The last row in this table reports the average
total response across all countries. The paper evaluates the trade elasticities at sample
means using the delta method. Focusing on CO2, the results show robust and statistically
significant evidence that on average, 1% increase in the share of trade to GDP will reduce
per capita emissions of CO2 anywhere from 0.93% in M1 to 2.7% in M3. Note that while
the coefficients from M1 and M2 display a smaller magnitude than that of those from M3,
the coefficients are still negative and significantly different from zero. This is a surprising
and interesting result since it shows that the implementation of TTIP may be really helpful
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in the fight against global warming by reducing per capita emissions of CO2 by about 2.7%
per year in the average TTIP country.35 Moreover, Table 9 shows robust and statistically
significant evidence that on average, 1% increase in the share of trade to GDP will reduce
per capita emissions of GHGs by 2.4% when using M3, by 1.3% when using M2 or by about
2.3% when using M1, respectively. Again, this is a very important result because it implies
that the implementation of TTIP may reduce per capita emissions of GHGs by around 2.4%
per year in the average TTIP member country.
However, this does not mean that every TTIP member country will benefit from this
agreement. As explained in the previous section, the role of TTIP on pollution for each spe-
cific TTIP country member depends on one’s comparative advantage in pollution-intensive
versus clean-intensive goods. Therefore, we may find countries that are poorer than the
U.S., but also more labor-abundant relative to the U.S., or countries that are more densely
populated than the U.S., but also more capital-abundant than the U.S., or countries that
are simultaneously poorer and more densely populated as compared to the U.S. Therefore,
it is quite possible theoretically to find that some countries in our dataset have negative
trade elasticities while others have positive trade elasticities. For a visual comparison, the
Appendix figures plot the country-specific elasticities from Table 9 as a function of income
relative to the U.S. (located on the top), with respect to the capital to labor ratios relative
to the U.S. (located in the middle), and finally with respect to the U.S. land per capita
(located at the bottom), respectively.
Overall, the results show that a TTIP member’s specific trade elasticity estimates are
negative for most of the countries under the analysis. However, the evidence also high-
lights positive and statistically significant estimates for Finland, Ireland, and Malta in the
case of CO2 per capita emissions. Further, at least when using M3, Ireland and the U.S. dis-
play positive and significant trade elasticities of GHGs per capita emissions. In some cases,
while the coefficients appear negative, they are not statistically different from zero. These
countries are Austria, Finland, Lithuania and Estonia in the case of GHGs and Austria and
Sweden in the case of CO2. The reader should keep in mind that these results are slightly
different when changing the models or the specification method.36
As mentioned above, the country specific elasticities may cast a different light on the
stated hypotheses and in particular on PHH1 and PHH2. For instance, the elasticities with
respect to relative income provide weak support for PHH1 that claims that rich countries
adopt stringent environmental laws and therefore pollute the environment less than the
35We focus on the results from M3 since we believe it is the most complete and less prone to omitted
variable bias.
36In each case, we focus on the results from M3. The results from M1 and M2 are relatively similar, even
though on average the latter appear slightly less significant.
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poor ones. As the figures show, there appears a positive relationship between relative
income and trade elasticities for most countries. This is in contrast with PHH1 since one
would expect a negative relationship between a TTIP member’s trade-elasticity of CO2
and its relative income level. However, there appears some support for PHH1 for several
countries. In particular, for countries with a relative income higher than that of Spain (i.e.,
RI higher than 0.7 approximately), one can note a negative relationship between their
relative income and trade elasticities of CO2. In other words, for this set of countries, one
may claim that the poorer ones adopt lax environmental regulations, and therefore, have
higher per capita emissions of CO2 due to the implementation of TTIP.
The evidence consistent with PHH1 appears stronger in the case of GHGs than in the
case of CO2. Focusing on the figures on the top, M1 and M3 show that for the majority
of countries, the relative richer ones have lower GHGs emissions. In particular, countries
that are richer then Croatia (located to the right of Croatia in the graph) reduce per capita
emissions of GHGs more as they get richer as a result of more trade.
Further, looking at the figures, the trade elasticities with respect to land per capita show
even more support for PHH2. The latter claims that the less densely populated countries
may become pollution havens. In particular, in the case of CO2 and for the countries
roughly to the right of Latvia (i.e., to the right of a ratio of approximately 0.8), there
appears to be a positive correlation between relative land per capita and the magnitude
of a country’s trade elasticity. This finding appears to be stronger for the case of GHGs
(this is more apparent under M2 and M3). Thus, for a land per capita in excess of about
0.1 (relative to the U.S.), there is a clear upward trend in the scatterplot of GHGs trade
elasticities and relative land per capita.
The figures in the middle show the compositional effects of trade with respect to the
FEH. For our sample, this hypothesis appears to be verified for the countries to the left
of Slovenia (i.e., for a relative capital to labor ratio less than around 0.65) in the case of
CO2 and to the left of Croatia in the case of GHGs (i.e., for a relative capital to labor ratio
less than approximately 0.54), respectively. In other words, we find a positive relationship
between relative capital abundance and the magnitude of a country’s trade elasticity for
countries to the left of Slovenia for CO2 and to the left of Croatia for GHGs, respectively. For
the rest of the countries, there appears no evidence that more capital-abundant countries
pollute the environment more.
In the case of GHGs, the average trade elasticity appears negative, indicating that PHH2
and FEH dominate PHH1. This is something that one may expect since most countries in
our dataset are more labor-abundant, poorer, and more densely populated as compared to
the U.S. Therefore, for a country like Romania, the implementation of TTIP, Ceteris Paribus,
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decreases per capita emissions of GHGs. The reasoning is that Romania is poorer, more
labor-abundant, and more densely populated than the U.S. Therefore, the implementation
of TTIP may push Romania towards a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods and
may pressure the U.S. to follow the PHH2, since Romania is more densely populated than
the U.S. Therefore, the FEH and PHH2 promote the production of dirty (clean) goods in
the U.S. (Romania). On the other hand, Romania is relatively much poorer than the U.S.,
which may force Romania to pursue the PHH1 due to the implementation of TTIP and
increase per capita emission of GHGs there.37
An interesting case is Sweden, which is more labor-abundant but richer than the U.S.
Thus, one may theoretically expect a negative trade elasticity for Sweden. However, a
closer look at Table 3 and at the Appendix figures located at the bottom, shows that Sweden
has a much lower density of population than the U.S., and therefore, the implementation
of TTIP may force Sweden to chase the PHH2 due to its higher land per capita. The trade
elasticity coefficient for Sweden appears positive but not significant for both GHGs and
CO2. Consequently, in the case of Sweden, PHH2 balances FEH and PHH1. This argument
may explain the insignificant effect of trade elasticity on Sweden’s per capita emission of
GHGs and CO2.
Another good example is, of course, the U.S. Table 3 clarifies that the U.S. is capital
and land abundant and richer than most EU members. Thus, the implementation of TTIP
could increase per capita emissions of GHGs and CO2 in the U.S. if FEH and PHH2 dominate
PHH1. In other words, if the latter argument is true, then the U.S. will raise the production
of pollution-intensive goods due to the implementation of TTIP, despite the fact that it
may have stringent environmental regulations as a result of enjoying a higher income.
Thus, the U.S. may act as a pollution heaven because it is sparsely populated. Moreover,
it has a comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods since it is a capital abundant
country. However, none of the three models finds significant coefficients for the U.S. trade
elasticities for CO2 per capita emissions. Consequently, this may indicate that PHH2 and
FEH even out PHH1. However, in the case of GHGs, M3 yields a positive and statistically
significant trade elasticity coefficient for the U.S. This may imply that in the U.S., PHH2
and FEH dominate PHH1.38
37However, this is not the case for Malta, which is more labor abundant, poorer but more densely populated
than the U.S. Thus, we conclude that the implementation of TTIP could help denigrate the environment in
Malta because it may help increase per capita emissions of GHGs by about 1.6 percent per year. This result
may hold because in the case of Malta, PHH1 dominates PHH2 and FEH.
38In the case of the U.S., the difference of the significance levels of coefficients of trade elasticities between
GHGs and CO2 could be related to our findings in our online Appendix entitled “Other Pollutants”. There, we
employ the same empirical techniques used in this paper to find statistically significant evidence of changing
per capita emissions of two other air pollutants that are part of GHGs as a result of more trade. In particular,
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In the case of GHGs, comparing the trade elasticities using M1 (as shown in the 2nd
column) with the trade elasticities using M2 (as shown in the 3rd column), may highlight
the importance of PHH2. For example, Germany has a positive trade elasticity coefficient
when we employ M1, but it has a negative one when we use M2. The positive coefficient
of trade elasticity using M1 may indicate that in Germany, PHH1 dominates FEH since
Germany is poorer and more labor abundant when compared to the U.S. However, the
introduction of PHH2 gives Germany a negative trade elasticity coefficient. This may em-
phasize the importance of PHH2 in Germany since the latter is more densely populated
than the U.S.
Using the same argument one can compare the signs, significance levels, and values
of the trade elasticity coefficients of M1 and M2 for the rest of the countries. It turns out
that PHH2 plays a very significant role in changing per capita emissions of GHGs due to
the implementation of TTIP for Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. In particular, in the case of the U.S., M1 yields a negative
and statistically significant coefficient. This finding indicates that the implementation of
TTIP may decrease per capita emissions of GHGs in the U.S. because PHH1 dominates
FEH. However, M2 reports a positive but not statistically significant coefficient of the trade
elasticity in the U.S. Therefore, one may suspect that the significance loss of the trade
elasticity coefficient when employing M2 instead of M1, emphasizes the importance of
PHH2 in the U.S. since the latter is a relative land abundant country as compared to all EU
member except for Finland and Sweden.
In light of the above results, Table 10 calculates the change in social costs in each
country due to changes in total CO2 emissions as a result of one percent increase in bi-
lateral trade between the U.S. and each EU country member. Following the literature,
the empirical exercise assumes a social cost of about 26.57 dollars (in 2013 U.S. dollars,
or 20 Euros) for each metric ton increase of total CO2 emissions per year. The value of
social costs represents an aggregate estimate of damages caused by global warming that
may affect mainly human health, the agriculture sector, and the energy sector. However,
environmentalists believe that the social costs are much higher even though it is very dif-
ficult to calculate them accurately due to data limitations.39 Table 10 shows these results,
whereby the parentheses report the per capita values of the social costs of CO2. Table
10 indicates that in a typical TTIP country, an increase of one percent in bilateral trade
we show that in a typical TTIP member, the implementation of TTIP will reduce per capita emissions of
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (fluorinated gases) and NO2 (Nitrogen Dioxide).
39For more details on the value of social costs, please see the latest technical report from TTIP and its
annexes available online at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154837.pdf. See
also https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html
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between trade partners will reduce social costs associated with CO2 by about 75 million
dollars under M1, or 106 million dollars under M2, or 220 million dollars under M3. Note
that M3 yields social costs that are statistically significant for 21 out of the 29 countries in
the dataset. It is important to note that the economic significance of the reduction of social
costs varies in different countries. Therefore, one may want to compare the first column of
Table 3 (relative income) and the values in parentheses (that represents the change of the
environmental costs per person) reported in Table 10, in order to get a better grasp of the
economic significance of the social costs’ reduction. For example, looking at the estimates
from M3, Luxembourg saves the most in social costs (a reduction of about 36 dollars per
person in a year), while France saves the least (about 4 dollars per person reduction in
a year) among the rich countries. Focusing on the poor countries, Poland saves the most
(about 15 dollars per person each year), while Slovakia saves the least (about 4 dollars per
person a year). In terms of economic growth, saving more in terms of social costs could be
more important in countries that are at relatively earlier stages of economic development.
For example, using M3 for Bulgaria and Germany, an increase of one percent of bilateral
trade per year between the U.S. and each of the former countries will reduce social costs
associated with CO2 by about 7 and 8 dollars per person for a year in Bulgaria and Ger-
many, respectively. However, one may speculate that 7 more dollars in the pockets of every
Bulgarian may mean much more for the Bulgarian economy than what 8 more dollars in
the pockets of every German may mean for the German economy.
Further Globalization Effects: Bilateral trade between the U.S. and a subset of EU coun-
tries in our dataset may also be affected by geographical, cultural, or political reasons. For
instance, some EU countries use English as an official language, or have sea or ocean access
or use the same currency. Therefore, especially for cases where we found a unique rela-
tionship between liberalized trade and each one of our pollutants, it may be of particular
interest to see if there is any evidence of a stronger relationship between the implementa-
tion of TTIP and the environment in countries that are more open to trade with the U.S. In
order to capture these effects, the paper employs three dummies: 1) the cross-product of
trade with a dummy that is 1 if the official language is English (English=1) reported in the
15th row, 2) the cross-product of trade with the Sea dummy (Sea=1) reported in the 16th
row, and 3) the cross-product of trade with the Euro dummy (where Euro=1) reported in
the 17th row of Tables 5 and 6.
The results yield statistically significant evidence, implying that the implementation
of TTIP in countries that use English as an official language would increase per capita
emissions of both CO2 and GHGs, relative to countries where English is not an official
language. Further, the results show that the implementation of TTIP in countries that
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have sea or ocean access would, in turn, reduce per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs
relative to countries that are landlocked. Finally, the tables report robust and statistically
significant evidence, indicating that the implementation of TTIP in countries that use Euro
as their common currency would increase per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs relative
to countries where Euro is not an official currency. This finding may be related to the
development stage of the Euro versus the non-Euro member countries and to the fact that
CO2 and GHGs, which are related to energy and transportation needs, may be facilitated
by the use of the same currency.
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Instrumenting Trade and Income with lags
The environmental literature has highlighted the potential endogeneity problems involving
the possible double causation among the pollutant measures, trade, and income, respec-
tively. For instance, the Porter hypothesis (see Porter and Van der Linde (1995)) claims
that stringent environmental regulations are not only beneficial to the environment, but
they may also act as incentives to promote or demote future growth through technological
innovations. In other words, stringent environment regulations may create a technolog-
ical revolution, (for example, absorbing energy from solar panels, or vehicles that oper-
ate with hybrid or electric engines vehicles) that reduces pollution and simultaneously
increases or decreases productivity. Consequently, from the very beginning, the “base”
specification employs the first lag of a three lag moving average of income per capita in
order to avoid the dual causality between each pollutant measure and per capita income
and also the contemporaneous correlation between income and trade. Specifically, the
“base” specification uses the first lag of income per capita following the weighting scheme,
whereIit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3. Results not reported in the paper, show that
this measure performs better out of sample in terms of a lower root mean squared forecast
error relative to an equally weighted scheme.40
However, this section performs additional robustness checks. Thus, a first alternative
specification instruments the potential endogeneity between trade and each pollutant, by
using the first lag of trade instead of its contemporaneous value. For instance, instead
of employing the contemporaneous value, this approach uses Tit = 0.6Tit−1 + 0.3Tit−2 +
40Separate unreported regressions use the level of Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ 3 . These results are
very similar to the ones reported in Tables 5 and 6 of this paper. For more details see Tables 5 and 6 of our
previous version of this paper, Pascalau and Qirjo (2016)
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0.1Tit−3. Consequently, this approach requires using the second lag of income per capita
(i.e., Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−3 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−4 ). Overall, the results are surprisingly sim-
ilar to those presented above. Tables 7 and 8 display the robustness results using the
instrumental variables approach outlined above. In general, the coefficients in Tables 7
and 8 have approximately the same magnitude and level of significance. However, some
differences exist. For instance, the coefficients on I and KL are now significant at the 5%
level when using fixed effects in both M1 and M2, unlike the corresponding ones in Table
5. Further, in the case of CO2, Table 8 yields minor differences. For instance, the fixed
effects of M3 specification does not any longer produce a significant coefficient for the in-
teraction of T and RI. Thus, it appears that PHH1 weakens when instrumenting trade and
income, respectively. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that the trade elasticities
reported in Table 9 and the Appendix figures are based on the results from Tables 7 and 8.
Therefore, the main interpretation of the results stands.
In addition, multicollinearity issues may occur between the KL and T variables and/or
between LPC and T variables due to the effect of trade on KL and LPC, respectively via
the income effect (Chisik et al. (2016) provide details on the relationship between trade
and population aging via the income channel). In order to avoid this additional issue,
one may pursue an instrumental variable approach, where one uses the first lag of KL
and the first lag of LPC instead of their contemporaneous values respectively (i.e., KLit =
0.6KLit−1 + 0.3KLit−2 + 0.1KLit−3 and LPCit = 0.6LPCit−1 + 0.3LPCit−2 + 0.1LPCit−3).
Those results, while not reported here but available upon request from the authors, provide
similar results.
7.2 Instrumenting Trade with Observables
A second robustness check follows Frankel and Rose (2005) to instrument trade with a
set of exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio,
price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country
uses euro, or has sea access, or uses English as its official language, or was a poor country
at the start of the sample, respectively.41 This exercise considers a country poor if its first
reported annual income was less than the EU average for that year, respectively. Tables
41Under this scenario, we proceed with the following two-stage least squares approach. First, we estimate
a reduced form for our trade variable using all the exogenous variables and we get the fitted values for
trade. Next, we construct instruments (not regressors) using the interaction between the predicted values
and relative income, relative capital to labor ratio and relative land per capita respectively. Finally, we
estimate the structural equation using all interacted instruments in addition to all the exogenous variables.
As Wooldridge (2010) argues in chapter 20 of the 2nd edition of his textbook entitled “Econometric Analysis
of Cross Section and Panel Data”: There is no need to adjust the standard errors asymptotically.
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11 and 12 report similar results to those in the “base” specifications. For instance, PHH1
verifies again. Thus, both in the case of CO2 and GHGs the interaction of Trade and RI
yields a negative and significant coefficient, with the second order effect being positive and
highly significant, respectively. However, some differences also appear. Thus, in the case
of GHGs, the interaction of T and RLPC appears now negative and significant, even though
as before a higher LPC has a positive and increasingly diminishing impact on pollution.
In addition, one result that stands out is that the CO2 reduction that trade appears to
cause is mainly coming from the poorer EU members. This result reinforces the previous
findings in the text.
Moreover, in order to control for the existence of potential different environmental
standards in the highly industrialized EU15 members versus the non-EU-15 members, this
second robustness check employs a dummy variable similar to the poor and rich dummy
variable above. However, the difference, in this case, consists in using a dummy that is one
if a country is an EU-15 member or the U.S. and a value of zero if a country is a non-EU-15
member. A possible additional dummy variable assigns a value of one if a country was
not under a Communist regime before 1990 and a value of zero if it was. In general, the
results from these separate exercises approximate those in Tables 11 and 12. Due to the
space limitations, they are not included but are available upon request from the authors.
Additional specifications include the use of various institutional variables of worldwide
governance indicators to control for the potential differences in environmental standards
(for details on these variables see Kaufmann et al. (2011)). However, these specifications
do not yield significant coefficients. While not included in this study, Pascalau and Qirjo
(2017) include them in Tables 14 and 20 of a follow-up to this project.
Furthermore, one may use a weighted value of trade intensity that is expressed as a
ratio of T to the world trade (where, WT = WE+WIWGDP , where WT, WE, WI, and WGDP
stands for the world trade, world exports, world imports, and world GDP, respectively). In
other words, we divide T with WT. The results remain the same in terms of their sign and
statistical significance, albeit with smaller economic coefficients. These results are also
available upon request from the authors.
The literature on growth and trade reports a reverse causality from income to trade
which in our case implies a potential collinearity problem. However, from the very be-
ginning, the “base” specification has employed lags of Income to alleviate this issue. In
addition, the volume of trade with the U.S. as a share of GDP is small at around 3.7%.
Also, the contemporaneous correlation between trade and income per capita in this sam-
ple is relatively small at only 9.17% on average. Therefore, the collinearity problem does
not appear to be a severe issue in our dataset.
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Finally, separate results may be obtained where instead of using a country’s labor force,
one may use a country’s labor force multiplied by its average hours of labor (taken from
the World PENN Tables 8.0), or a country’s labor force multiplied with its human capital
(taken again from the World PENN Tables 8.0), or a country’s labor force multiplied with
its average hours of labor and then multiplied by its human capital. All of these additional
results are very similar to the main results in the paper.42 Again, to save space we omit
these additional results but they are available upon request from the authors.43
8 Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates the effects that the implementation of TTIP may have
on CO2 and GHGs, respectively. The present study employs a panel dataset of 28 EU
members and the U.S. over the 1989-2013 time period. The evidence suggests that for a
typical TTIP member, trade liberalization may indeed have a consistently beneficial impact
on the environment. In particular, holding all the other factors constant, the results yield
robust and statistically significant evidence suggesting that one percent increase in the
bilateral trade between the U.S. and an average EU member reduces per capita emissions
of CO2 by about 2.7 percent. This reduction generates average social costs savings of
about 220 million dollars per year (or 7.70 dollars per person per year). Similarly, the
results yield robust and statistically significant evidence that the implementation of TTIP
may help reduce per capita emissions of GHGs by around 2.4 percent per year in a typical
TTIP member. However, the implementation of TTIP may not provide a beneficial impact
on the environment of all TTIP members. For instance, evidence in the paper implies that
one percent bilateral trade increase may raise per capita emissions of GHGs per capita in
the U.S. by about 2.5 percent per year. The reasoning for this increase appears related
to the fact that in the U.S., FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1 since the U.S. is more capital
abundant, more sparsely populated and richer than an average EU member.
42For more on the data of human capital as reported in the World PENN Tables 8.0 see Feenstra et al.
(2015)
43We have also attempted a GMM approach to alleviate potential concerns about endogeneity. Thus, we
have experimented with both a difference and a system GMM, where we used both a one-step and a two-step
estimator, respectively. However, since in our sample T is not small relative to N, we run into an instrument
proliferation problem. Thus, while trying to instrument both Trade and Income with previous lags, even
though the coefficient signs and magnitudes appear similar to our original results, we get a perfect Hansen
statistic of 1. This is indicative of the fact that the instruments in this case over fit the endogenous variables
and/or that the instruments outnumber the individual countries. Therefore, we refrain from posting these
additional results. However, with a large T, we argue that the potential endogeneity problem due to the
correlation between a shock to a country’s error and a country’s fixed effects dwindles over time, which
alleviates the endogeneity problem.
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In the case of both pollutants, the paper provides robust evidence consistent with
PHH1, which claims a negative relationship between national pollution and national in-
come per capita. Moreover, the results yield statistically significant evidence consistent
with PHH2 in the case of GHGs. PHH2 claims a negative relationship between national
pollution and national population density as a result of TTIP. Further, the study reports
strong statistically significant evidence consistent with the FEH in the case of both air
pollutants, implying that the implementation of TTIP may help reduce pollution in labor-
abundant countries and increase it in capital-abundant ones.
Since the typical EU member is poorer, more labor-abundant, and more densely pop-
ulated than the U.S., one can not unambiguously predict the impact of TTIP on the envi-
ronment. However, at least in the case of CO2, the paper provides statistically significant
evidence that FEH dominates PHH1. In addition, the evidence suggests that in the cases
of GHGs, FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1.
Moreover, the results of this paper suggest that the implementation of TTIP benefits the
environment of the poor countries more than it does that of the rich ones. The intuition
for this result possibly relates to the fact that all the poor EU members are more labor
abundant than the rich EU members are relative to the U.S. Thus, based on the FEH, the
poor EU members produce less capital-intensive goods and export more labor-abundant
goods to the U.S. than the rich EU members do. In addition, the poor countries may
see a more rapid adoption of environmentally friendly technologies due to the foreign
direct investment spillover effects. The poor EU members may also benefit more from
the increased public awareness of the pollution risks resulting from the implementation of
TTIP.
Further, results show that countries with sea or ocean access have lower per capita
emissions of both CO2 and GHGs than landlocked ones as a result of TTIP. Additional
evidence suggests that countries that use the Euro (English) as the common currency (of-
ficial language) experience higher per capita emissions of CO2 and GHGs due to TTIP than
countries that do not. However, the latter result could be more related to the level of de-
velopment that EU members have relative to the U.S. than the use of the same currency or
language.
Overall, this study concludes that on average the adoption of TTIP may surprisingly
truly help in the fight against global warming because of the reduction in per capita emis-
sions of GHGs and CO2, respectively. However, this is not the case for all TTIP members.
For instance, evidence suggests that the implementation of TTIP may denigrate the en-
vironment in the U.S. because of the net increase in per capita emissions of GHGs. We
suggest that the implementation of TTIP may denigrate the environment in the U.S., at
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least in the case of GHGs, because it may shift some GHGs emissions from most of the EU
members towards the U.S. This suggestion is based on the robust and statistically signifi-
cant evidence implying that PHH2 and FEH dominate PHH1.
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Table 1: List of Countries in our dataset
Austria Germany Poland
Belgium Greece Portugal
Bulgaria Hungary Romania
Croatia Ireland Slovakia
Cyprus Italy Slovenia
Czech Republic Latvia Spain
Denmark Lithuania Sweden
Estonia Luxembourg United Kingdom
Finland Malta United States of America
France Netherlands
Table 2: Data Sources and their unit of measurement
Variable Source Unit of Measurement
CO2 (Carbon Dioxide) EDGAR (2015) Mg per Capita
GHGs (Greenhouse Gases) UNFCCC (2015) Tg in CO2 equiv. per capita
Real GDP per capita (I) IMF (2015) Real (2005) U.S. Dollars
Capital to Labor Ratios (KL) PENN World Tables 8.0 Real (2005) PPPs U.S. Dollars
Trade Intensity (T) IMF (2015) Percentage (0-100)
FDI Stock/Capital Stock (FDI) IMF (2015) Percentage (0-100)
Land area per capita (log) (LPC) CIA World Factbook (2015) log of (Km2per capita)
Dummy for Landlocked {T(Sea dummy)} CIA World Factbook (2015) Percentage (0-100]=access to sea, 0=landlocked
Dummy for Language {T(English dummy)} CIA World Factbook (2015) Percentage (0-100]=English, 0=otherwise
Dummy for Euro {T(Euro dummy)} Eurostat (2015) Percentage (0-100]=using Euro, 0=otherwise
38
Table 3: Relative (to the U.S.) Measures of Income, Capital/labor and Land per Capita
ratios
Country Relative Income Relative KL ratio Relative LPC ratio
Austria 0.882 1.183 0.318
Belgium 0.827 0.935 0.091
Bulgaria 0.087 0.263 0.428
Croatia 0.199 0.539 0.388
Cyprus 0.356 0.828 0.304
Czech Republic 0.255 0.589 0.233
Denmark 1.078 0.874 0.247
Estonia 0.179 0.294 0.963
Finland 0.865 0.969 1.825
France 0.822 0.920 0.332
Germany 0.827 0.909 0.131
Greece 0.442 0.776 0.376
Hungary 0.197 0.467 0.275
Ireland 0.859 0.706 0.545
Italy 0.699 1.176 0.158
Latvia 0.142 0.296 0.842
Lithuania 0.139 0.239 0.581
Luxembourg 1.681 1.689 0.1822
Malta 0.322 0.659 0.024
Netherlands 0.871 0.978 0.066
Poland 0.162 0.333 0.248
Portugal 0.397 0.581 0.277
Romania 0.092 0.246 0.321
Slovakia 0.193 0.421 0.279
Slovenia 0.374 0.653 0.313
Spain 0.546 0.837 0.372
Sweden 1.025 0.660 1.426
UK 0.813 0.603 0.127
U.S. 1 1 1
39
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Summary Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Variable Dimension N Mean SD Min Max Unit Root Tests
CO2 Level 725 9.159 4.660 3.059 34.770 -4.094***
GHG Level 725 10.435 4.786 0.562 34.807 -2.151**
Trade % - (X+M)/GDP 725 3.712 5.005 0.272 103.540 -3.957***
Rel. K/L U.S. = 1 725 0.711 .346 0.095 1.936 0.753***
Rel. I U.S. = 1 725 0.562 0.406 0.014 2.289 0.856*
Rel. LPC U.S. = 1 725 0.437 0.407 0.023 1.955 0.996*
I Level 637 22.716 16.762 0.474 100.816 -1.917**
K/L Level 725 158.455 84.453 16.616 522.945 -1.559*
FDI/K Level 725 0.132 0.189 0 1.263 -3.665***
LPC Log 725 9.184 0.890 6.602 11.021 -1.171*
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. For all series,
with the exception of the "relative" series, we use the Z-t-tilde-bar statistic of the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-
root test where the AR parameter is panel specific. In all cases, we also include a time trend. For the
"relative" series, we compute the Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test since the Im-Pesaran-Shin test did not
meet the required assumptions. The null states that all panels contain unit roots, while the alternative
states that some panels are stationary.
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Table 9: Elasticity Coefficients
Estimation Method GHGs CO2
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE (M1) RE (M2) RE (M3) RE (M1) RE (M2) RE (M3)
Trade
Austria -3.894*** -3.323*** -1.259 -2.076*** -2.918*** -.266
Belgium -1.803*** -2.634*** -6.651*** .126 -.049 -3.828***
Bulgaria -2.053*** -.457 -3.413** -2.328** -2.995** -7.540***
Croatia -.734** .812 -1.274* .428 -.524 -3.464***
Cyprus -1.292*** -.295 -2.129*** .183 -.615 -3.224***
Czech Republic -.588** .167 1.098 .797** .285 2.147
Denmark -1.593*** -1.506*** -3.821*** .240 -.329 -2.923***
Estonia -1.592*** 1.107 -.433 -1.479** -1.667* -3.637***
Finland -1.903*** .297 -.528 -.102 1.543 .987
France -1.554*** -1.053* -2.608*** .126 -.772 -2.577***
Germany 1.166*** -1.763*** -4.498*** .481 .203 -3.047***
Greece -.713*** .353 -1.136* .871** -.187 -2.076***
Hungary -.847*** .103 .929 .175 -.463 1.267
Ireland -1.143* .074 1.405*** .486 -.547 .991*
Italy -3.834*** -4.065*** -6.071*** -2.301*** -3.088*** -5.698***
Latvia -1.949*** -.099 -2.619** -2.195** -2.879*** -6.439***
Lithuania -1.624*** 1.004 -.747 -1.548** -1.942** -4.033***
Luxembourg -25.548*** -20.259*** -16.019*** -18.551*** -15.600*** -11.527***
Malta -.775** -1.213*** -.641* .685** 1.113** 1.606**
Nederlands -2.152*** -3.188*** -6.961*** -.156 -.276 -4.189***
Poland -1.397*** -.896 -4.229*** -1.109* -1.684** -6.843***
Portugal -.524*** -.015 -2.141*** .771** .023 -2.831***
Romania -2.075*** -1.131 -4.575*** -2.400*** -3.079*** -8.508***
Slovakia -.572** .315 -1.631*** .916*** .042 -2.611***
Slovenia -1.182*** -.255 -1.613*** .403 -.622 -2.302***
Spain -1.034*** -.225 .505 -.319 -.958 .667
Sweden -.691 1.176 .208 .608 .682 -.182
UK -.527 -1.480*** -1.229* .651 .475 .670
USA -2.124*** .324 2.506** -.175 -.906 1.224
Average -2.306*** -1.315*** -2.399*** -.924** -1.301** -2.696***
The results in this table show the percentage response in the GHGs and CO2 measures for a 1% increase in
Trade, respectively. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show coefficients of Trade elasticities for GHGs using Model 1,
2, and 3 respectively. Columns (4), (5), and (6) indicate Trade elasticities for CO2 using Models 1, 2, and 3
respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The study
employs the Delta method to compute the Trade elasticities. The last row reports the average Trade elasticity
across all countries for each air pollutant under all Models. We use the results of Tables 7 and 8 to compute
our Trade Elasticities. Note that the coefficients of Trade elasticities are generally very similar in terms of their
significance level and sign when we use the results of Tables 5 and 6 instead of Tables 7 and 8. We do not report
these results here, but they are available upon request to the authors. Note that all negative and statistically
significant Trade elasticities are in blue color implying a beneficial impact on the environment as a consequence
of the implementation of TTIP. All positive and statistically significant Trade elasticities are in red color indicating
a degradation of the environment due to the implementation of TTIP.
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Table 10: CO2-based Environmental Social Costs
∆ Social Costs (% ∆) ∆ Social Costs (% ∆) ∆ Social Costs (% ∆)
(M1) (M2) (M3)
Trade
Austria -40,909,415 (-4.8)*** -57,493,163 (-6.8)*** -5,243,064 (-0.6)
Belgium 3,532,395 (0.3) -1,386,452 (-0.1) -10,6735,350 (-9.6)***
Bulgaria -15,352,150 (-2.1)** -19,750,388 (-2.7)** -49,713,262 (-6.9 )***
Croatia 5,663,683 (1.3) -6,923,500 (-1.6) -45,773,307 (-10.7)***
Cyprus 498,593 (0.4) -1,675,924 (-1.5) -8,785,457 (-7.7) ***
Czech Republic 16,051,880 (1.5)** 5,741,337 (0.5) 43,191,039 (4.0)
Denmark 2,128,530 (0.4) -2,917,405 (0.5) -25,881,265 (4.6)***
Estonia -7,287,088 (-5.7)** -8,208,812 (-6.4)* -17,911,498 (-13.9)***
Finland -1,167,591 (-0.2) 17,561,220 (3.2) 11,235,037 (2.1)
France 12,178,875 (0.2) -74,188,303 (-1.2) -247,424,625 (-3.8 )***
Germany 99,310,233 (1.2) 41,971,844 (0.5) -629,246,661 (-7.6)***
Greece 18,607,278 (1.7)** -4,003,955 (-0.4) -44,351,201 (-4.0)***
Hungary 2,279,102 (0.2) -6,030,230 (-0.6) 16,485,369 (1.7)
Ireland 5,771,816 (1.2) -6,499,796 (-1.4) 11,764,998 (2.5)*
Italy -213,480,589 (-3.5)*** -286,544,153 (-4.7)*** -528,731,864 (-8.7)***
Latvia -1,281,385 (-0.6)** -1,680,468 (-0.8)*** -3,758,274 (-1.8)***
Lithuania -6,104,820 (-2.0)** -7,659,768 (-2.5)** -15,904,408 (-5.3)***
Luxembourg -30,557,122 (-57.6)*** -25,696,028 (-48.4)*** -18,986,576 (-35.8)***
Malta 448,552 (1.0)** 728,838 (1.7)** 1,051,526 (2.5)**
Nederlands -6,739,745 (-0.4) -11,923,612 (-0.7) -180,342,598 (-10.8)***
Poland -91,010,773 (-2.4)* -138,137,716 (-3.6)** -561,273,714 (-14.7)***
Portugal 9,874,943 (0.9)** 294,820 (0.0) -36,223,618 (-3.4)***
Romania -74,442,625 (-3.4)*** -95,501,038 (-4.4)*** -263,822,669 (-12.2)***
Slovakia 7,813,275 (1.4)*** 356,859 (0.1) -22,272,201 (-4.1)***
Slovenia 1,594,291 (0.8) -2,457,673 (-1.2) -9,098,671 (-4.4)***
Spain -21,478,600 (-0.5) -64,457,182 (-1.4) 44,872,538 (1.0)
Sweden 8,031,757 (0.8) 9,008,286 (0.9) -2,407,289 (-0.3)
UK 72,581,499 (1.1) 52,906,867 (0.8) 74,625,560 (1.2)
USA -249,989,194 (-0.8) -1,288,106,971 (-4.0) 173,980,8977 (5.4)
Average -75,127,132 (-2.6)** -105,830,765 (-3.7) ** -219,259,834 (-7.7)***
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level. The results of this table show the
change in environmental social costs in response to a 1% increase of bilateral trade between the US and
the respective EU member. The environmental social costs are assumed to be 26.57 in 2013 US dollars per
ton of total CO2 emissions. All the changes in the environmental social costs for CO2 emissions are shown
for 2013 (the most recent year in our dataset). Furthermore, in parenthesis and in italic, we show the
respective per capita values of environmental social costs’ change. A negative value of the environmental
social costs’ change indicates the value of social environmental gains as a result of trade.
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Elasticities Graphs
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Note: These Figures plot the entries in Table 9. Each vertical axis corresponds to the Trade Elasticities of CO2 produced by the
Random Effects (RE) specification of Models M1, M2, and M3, respectively. The first row plots the elasticities with respect to
Relative Income, the second with respect to the Relative Capital/Labor (K/L) ratio, and the third with respect to Relative Land
Per Capita (LPC), respectively. The vertical line in each case corresponds to the elasticity coefficient of the U.S., which provides
the benchmark for the Relative Income, K/L, and LPC variables, respectively. The Fitting Curve provides an ad-hoc polynomial
approximation to help the reader visualize the pattern in the elasticities.
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Note: These Figures plot the entries in Table 9. Each vertical axis corresponds to the Trade Elasticities of GHGs produced by the
Random Effects (RE) specification of Models M1, M2, and M3, respectively. The first row plots the elasticities with respect to
Relative Income, the second with respect to the Relative Capital/Labor (K/L) ratio, and the third with respect to Relative Land
Per Capita (LPC), respectively. The vertical line in each case corresponds to the elasticity coefficient of the U.S., which provides
the benchmark for the Relative Income, K/L, and LPC variables, respectively. The Fitting Curve provides an ad-hoc polynomial
approximation to help the reader visualize the pattern in the elasticities.
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Appendix
This appendix shows the data imputation methods for the main variables in the study.
Trade: Most of the missing observations for Trade occur during the early part of the
sample, specifically from 1989 to approximately 1993. For instance, until
1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia were part of Czechoslovakia. In this
case, we fill the missing gaps for both countries by using the aggregate data
for Czechoslovakia and using the would-be weight of Trade for the Czech
Republic and Slovakia as if they were a single country over the 1993 to 1998
period. Instead, for the Baltic countries, we use the Amelia II program and
a set of factors for which complete information exists, e.g., total population,
the unemployment rate, labor force, and a time trend, respectively. We then
individually check every imputed value for consistency with the immediately
proceeding and following values to make sure that no aberrant observations
are produced.
Pollutants: As Table 1 shows, we use several different sources to gather the pollutant
data. The results section employs the measure where the fewest missing ob-
servations were found. Thus, both the CO2 and GHGs measures do not require
any imputations since we had a complete dataset.
Income: As in the case of the Trade measure, we proceeded in a similar manner for
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively. In rest, since the GDP measure
follows an exponential trend, we employ a square polynomial trend to esti-
mate the few missing observations for the 1989 - 1993 period for the Baltic
countries, Croatia and Slovenia, respectively.
KL: Both the capital stock as reported by the World Penn Tables and the labor
force measure as reported by the IMF are fairly complete series. However,
since as in the previous cases some missing observations occur at the start
of the sample (usually over the 1989-1993 period) we use a simple trend or
square polynomial trend regression.
FDI: We obtain the annual Foreign Direct Investment data from the UNCTAD database.
We follow the approach above to fill in the few missing observations for the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively. In rest, we use the Amelia pro-
gram in R with the following covariates: total population, real, GDP, the Gross
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Fixed Capital Formation and the changes in inventories, respectively to impute
the missing observations for the few countries with missing information (i.e.,
Croatia over the 1989 to 1991 period, Cyprus over the 1989 to 1995 pe-
riod, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia over the 1989 to 1991 period, Hungary
for 1989, Luxembourg over the 1989 to 2001 period, and Slovenia over the
1989 to 1991 period, respectively). The Gross Fixed Capital Formation and
the changes in inventories variables are from the IMF and have no missing
information.
LPC: LPC is complete and has no missing information. The CIA Factbook (2015)
supplies the land area information for each country.
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